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Abstract 
Previous studies on hypothesis-testing behaviour have reported systematic preferences for posing 
positive questions (i.e., inquiries about features that are consistent with the truth of the hypothesis) 
and different types of asymmetric questions (i.e., questions where the hypothesis confirming and 
the hypothesis disconfirming responses have different evidential strength). Both tendencies can 
contribute – in some circumstances – to confirmation biases (i.e., the improper acceptance or 
maintenance of an incorrect hypothesis). The empirical support for asymmetric testing is, however, 
scarce and partly contradictory, and the relative strength of positive testing and asymmetric testing 
has not been empirically compared. In four studies where subjects were asked to select (Experiment 
1) or evaluate (Experiment 2, 3, 4) questions for controlling an abstract hypothesis, we orthogonally 
balanced the positivity/negativity of questions by their symmetry/asymmetry (Experiment 1, 2, 3), 
or by the type of asymmetry (confirmatory vs disconfirmatory; Experiment 4). In all Experiments 
participants strongly preferred positive to negative questions. Their choices were on the other hand 
mostly unaffected  by symmetry and asymmetry in general, or – more specifically – by different 
types of asymmetry. Other results indicated that participants were sensitive to the diagnosticity of 
the questions (Experiments 1,2,3), and that they preferred testing features with a high probability 
under the focal hypothesis (Experiment 4). In the discussion we argue that recourse to asymmetric 
testing – observed in some previous studies using more contextualized problems – probably 
depends on context-related motivations and prior-knowledge. In abstract tasks, where that 
knowledge is not available, more simple strategies – such as positive testing – are prevalent.   
PsycINFO classification: 2340 (Cognitive Processes) 
Keywords: hypothesis testing; information selection; probabilistic reasoning. 
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Whenever we explicitly test the plausibility of a hypothesis, we ask questions either to 
ourselves, or to other people and external data bases. Since gathering all the evidence needed for an 
exhaustive check is seldom feasible, giving priority to some questions implies giving priority to 
some pieces of information above others. Different studies have emphasized that some human 
trends in gathering information might – in certain environments – cause undesirable side effects 
such as confirmation biases (Wason, 1960, 1968; Klayman & Ha, 1987; Nickerson, 1996, 1998) or 
the preservation of social stereotypes (Trope & Thompson, 1997; Cameron & Trope, 2004). The 
main goal of this study is to further explore two of those tendencies, namely  the alleged preference 
for posing asymmetrical questions and positive questions (the latter, also known as “congruent” 
questions, Baron, Beattie, & Hershey, 1988), in order to verify their actual occurrence and to 
compare their relative strengths in abstract tasks, where domain-specific motivations and prior 
knowledge are hardly accessible.   
1. Positivity and Asymmetry of Questions 
A common definition describes a positive question as a question where a positive response 
(“yes”) supports the truth of the hypothesis (Snyder & Swann, 1978; Klayman & Ha, 1987; 
Klayman, 1995). Posing positive questions does not however necessarily imply an ability to 
anticipate the epistemic effects of the “yes” or “no” responses. They can more simply originate 
from a tendency to inquire about features that “match” the hypothesis, i.e. features that are more 
typical of instances where the hypothesis is true, than of instances where it is false. When 
investigating whether a target individual is an extrovert, for example,  asking “does she like 
parties?” is a positive question. The inquired feature matches the representation of an extrovert, and 
– as a result – a “yes” supports the hypothesis of extroversion, while a “no” weakens it. By contrast, 
asking “does she enjoy long solitary walks?” is a negative question: the feature matches the 
representation of an introvert, and accordingly a “yes” weakens the hypothesis of extroversion, and 
a “no” supports it. Symmetry/asymmetry of questions is more complex, as it is a matter of the 
quantity of information received and not only of its valence. An asymmetric query can – depending 
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on the answer it receives –  confirm a hypothesis more than it can disconfirm it (asymmetrically 
confirming questions; or “high risk” testing strategies, Poletiek & Berndsen, 2000), or vice-versa 
(asymmetrically disconfirming questions; also known as “extreme” tests, Skov & Sherman, 1986; 
Slowiaczek, Klayman, Sherman, & Skov, 1992; or “low risk” testing strategies, Poletiek & 
Berndsen, 2000). Investigating, for instance, the extroversion of a person by asking “is she always 
the life of parties?” is an asymmetrically confirming test: a “yes” response is improbable, but, if 
received, would strongly support the hypothesis. On the other hand, a “no” response  is probable, 
but – if received –  only weakly disconfirms the hypothesis. Similarly the question “does she love 
spending most Saturday evenings reading poetry by herself?” is asymmetrically disconfirming (a 
“yes” strongly falsifies extroversion, whereas a “no” only weakly confirms it). For a stricter 
definition of asymmetry, many quantitative measures of the strength of confirmation are available 
(Crupi, Tentori, & Gonzalez, 2007). The first, most common, and easiest one is the Bayes’ factor. A 
common formal description of logically sound belief revision is the Bayes’ rule. It states how a 
degree of belief in the truth of a hypothesis H (expressed as the epistemic probability that H is true) 
should be revised in the light of a body of newly acquired evidence. A useful formulation of the 
Bayes’ rule is in terms of odds and likelihood ratios (Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983; Fischhoff & 
Beyth-Marom, 1983; Good, 1950, 1960, 1983; Osteyee & Good, 1974):  
p (H | E)  p (H)        p (E | H) 
p (¬H | E)  p (¬H)        p (E | ¬H) 
 
where p() is read “probability of”, H means “the hypothesis is true”, ¬H means “the hypothesis is 
false”, E is the body of evidence, and the | symbol stands for a conditional probability (it can be 
read “given”). Reading from the left, the three terms of the formula are:  
(a) the posterior odds:  the ratio between the probability that H is true given E and the 
probability that H is false given E; 
(b) the prior odds:  the ratio between the probability that H was true before acquiring E, and the 
probability that it was false; 
x = 
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(c) the Bayes factor, that is the Likelihood Ratio of E (thereafter, LR):  the ratio between the 
probability of observing E assuming the truth of H and the probability of nevertheless 
observing E if H were false. 
Bayes’ rule is a straightforward and undisputed consequence of the basic axioms of standard 
probability calculus. More importantly, the LR appropriately describes an intuition that is common 
in many fields where correctly weighing evidence is critically important, such as medical diagnosis 
or legal judgement. A piece of evidence (e.g., a symptom, a clue) that is equally probable regardless 
of whether H (e.g., a possible diagnosis, a charge of wrongdoing) is true or false, does not change 
the probability that H is true or false, and therefore it is uninformative. Such a piece of evidence, 
with  p(E | H) = p(E | ¬H ), has LR =  1, and thus leaves the posterior odds unchanged with respect 
to the prior odds. Along the same lines, a piece of evidence with LR > 1 increases the posterior 
probability of H with respect to ¬H: it is thus confirmatory. Finally, a piece of evidence with LR < 1 
decreases the posterior probability of H with respect to ¬H: it is  disconfirmatory. A dichotomous 
question – namely one accepting only “yes/no” as mutually exclusive answers – is symmetric if and 
only if the two answers have the same LR (a “yes” confirms H exactly as much as a “no” confirms 
¬H, or vice-versa). Otherwise, it is asymmetric.  
Symmetric queries are “fair” questions, with equal chances1 of either confirming or 
disconfirming the hypothesis by the same amount of evidential strength. By choosing them, 
inquirers do not commit themselves either to a conservative or to a non-conservative stance (in 
technical terms, they equate the risk of incurring in a Type II, false negative, or a Type I, false 
positive, error). Asymmetric confirming tests have a relatively low probability of yielding strong 
evidence in support of the hypothesis, and a correspondingly high probability of finding weak 
evidence that refutes it.  They are conservative questions, as they maximize the chances of (weakly) 
rejecting the hypothesis, while minimizing those of (strongly) accepting it. Asymmetric confirming 
                                                 
1 Whilst the properties of LRs are independent  of the priors p(H) and p(⌐H), the probabilities of receiving either a 
confirming or a disconfirming answer depend upon p(H). Where we discuss them in this paper we assume that p(H)=.5, 
a common assumption in most other previous studies on this topic, and a premise in our experiments. 
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queries shift the balance in favour of Type II, false negative errors, and accordingly should be 
typical of contexts where there are good reasons to prefer type II errors to type I errors (e.g., when 
evaluating a crime charge in a judicial setting).  By contrast, asymmetric disconfirming questions 
have a relatively low probability of finding strong evidence that disconfirms the hypothesis, and a 
correspondingly high probability of yielding weak evidence in support of it. By making probable a 
weak confirmation at the expense of an  improbable strong  refutation of the hypothesis, they denote 
a preference for risking Type I instead of Type II errors: a typical attitude of some preliminary 
medical screening tests (such as the PSA test for prostate cancer), or of the “overprotecting” policy 
in antiterrorism airport checks (Hammond, 2007).  An alternative – and common – name for these 
latter sort of questions is “extreme tests” (Skov & Sherman, 1986), meaning that they address the 
feature that has the most extreme probability (either high or low) under the focal hypothesis, and the  
less extreme probability under the alternative one.  
The properties of symmetric or asymmetric queries are formally independent of their 
positivity/negativity: that is, a question can be symmetric, asymmetric confirming, or asymmetric 
disconfirming, disregarding whether the response that supports the hypothesis is “yes” or “no”. 
In theory, the best questions to posit are the most diagnostic ones,  those with a maximal 
expected utility in informational terms. It can be measured as the mean LR – that is the weighed 
average of the LR of the confirming response in support of the hypothesis and the LR of the 
disconfirming response in support of the alternative hypothesis: 2 
)(
1)()()(.
ationdisconfirmLR
ationdisconfirmponconfirmatiLRonconfirmatipMeanLR ∗+∗=  
                                                 
2 Mean LR – or the mean Weight of Evidence (see Appendix C)  – is a rough measure of the overall utility of a 
question, even though it is widely used in literature (e.g., Trope & Bassok, 1982; Slowiaczek, Klayman, Sherman, & 
Skov, 1992). A more proper measure is the less intuitive expected Information Gain (IG), computed as a difference in 
informational entropy before and after having received an answer to the question (Oaksford & Chater, 2007). In this 
case, as in most others where the prior probabilities of the hypotheses are the same, overall usefulness as measured by 
expected I.G. (or any other measure that has been proposed, such as Kullback-Leibler’s numbers) is directly 
proportional to the usefulness as measured by mean LR – that therefore is a viable measure. 
 . 
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By not choosing the most diagnostic questions among the available ones, a person risks to 
throw away useful information, thus increasing the chances of avoidable errors. Diagnosticity is 
never affected by the positivity/negativity of the query. Furthermore, it is not systematically 
affected by its symmetry/asymmetry: depending on the parameters associated to the tested features, 
there can be symmetric and asymmetric questions of equal diagnosticity, symmetric queries more 
diagnostic than asymmetric ones, or asymmetric queries more diagnostic than symmetric ones. The 
opportunity for deciding whether to address symmetric or asymmetric questions, and which type of 
the latter, on the grounds of context-driven preferences in order to risk different types of errors is 
granted. In order to minimize the overall probability of occurrence of an error of any type, however, 
these sorts of decisions should occur among questions of similar diagnosticity, wherever possible.  
Some psychologically-grounded preferences for certain  testing strategies might foster the 
systematic selection of sub-optimal questions, thus unnecessarily increasing the overall chances of 
errors 
These sorts of errors have been vastly studied in psychology under the name of 
“confirmation biases”. They might consist either of avoidable Type I errors (occurring when one 
accepts a false hypothesis as true on the ground of biased evidence), or of avoidable type II errors 
(when sticking to an old, improper, but believed true opinion,  in the face of available contrary 
evidence; this is also known as “conservatism”, Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983; or “persistence of 
beliefs”, Nisbett & Ross, 1980), or of a mix of them. A wide debate has spawned on the formal and 
psychological details of how different testing strategies might result in biased acceptance  or 
rejection of hypotheses. The issue is complex, even though it is very important for a better 
understanding of how different people sometimes get sincerely convinced of opposite and 
incompatible opinions, thus causing conflicts at all levels of society (Nickerson, 1998). Even 
though it can be argued that most of the observed psychological testing tendencies are not 
suboptimal a-priori, because they can be – and often are – “optimal” in some specific environments 
(e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 1994; McDonald, 1992), most scholars currently agree that some testing 
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strategies – including positive testing and asymmetric testing – can result in biased opinions mostly 
by their synergies with other psychological and environmental factors, such as different response 
sets (e.g. Zuckerman, Knee, Hodgins, & Miyake, 1995), information-evaluation biases (e.g. Lord, 
Ross & Lepper, 1979; Newman, Wolff, & Hearst, 1980;  Ross & Anderson, 1982; Henrion & 
Fischhoff, 1986; Poses, Bekes, Copare & Scott, 1990; Slowiaczek,  et al., 1992; Koehler, 1993; 
Cameron & Trope, 2004), or the type of local environment where the evidence has been harvested 
(e.g. Klayman & Ha, 1987; Klayman, 1995; Nickerson, 1998; Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler, Brinkmann, & 
Betsch, 2000).  
2. Empirical Evidence Concerning Asymmetry 
There is a widespread acknowledgment that asymmetric questions are preferred to 
symmetric ones: “Subjects’ overall preferences in information gathering reflected an additive 
combination of three favored qualities: diagnosticity, positive testing, and extremity [i.e., 
asymmetrically disconfirming tests]” (Slowiaczek et al., 1992, p.395); “three factors seem to drive 
people’s choices: diagnosticity, positivity, and extremity.” (McKenzie, 2004, p.206).  Close 
scrutiny of the literature, nevertheless, shows that this consensus does not stand on firm ground. As 
far as the symmetric vs. asymmetric comparison is concerned, only a handful of data is available, 
and it is mostly inconclusive.  Even the more specific comparison between preferences for 
asymmetric confirming vs. asymmetric disconfirming questions yielded partly contradictory 
findings.  
2.1 Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Queries 
Slowiaczek et al.’s (1992) wrote “there is evidence that people prefer to ask about features 
with one extreme probability, compared with symmetrical questions of equal diagnosticity”, citing 
as their only reference the  “certainty bias” found by Baron et al. (1988). Baron and his colleagues, 
however, did not investigate symmetrical tests, apart from two very exceptional forms of them:  
certain tests, incapable of making errors, with p(E|H)=1 and p(E|⌐H)=0, and uninformative tests 
with p(E|H)= p(E|⌐H). Results concerning those peculiar tests cannot be generalized to the totality 
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of symmetrical tests. Some more general data concerning preferences for symmetric vs. asymmetric  
tests can be extrapolated from studies that addressed different research issues, and they are mostly 
inconsistent with the view that asymmetric questions are generally preferred to symmetric ones. In 
their seminal study that proved the sensitivity of human hypothesis-testing strategies to the 
diagnosticity of questions, Trope and Bassok (1982) used, in their first Experiment, a set of four 
high-diagnosticity and four low-diagnosticity questions. Their research goal was to compare 
sensitivity to diagnosticity to the preference for positive testing. With reference to the probability 
parameters reported in Trope and Bassok’s Table 1 (p.25), we classified their queries according to 
the symmetry/asymmetry dimension, as follows:  
Low Diagnosticity questions:  
1. very low p(feature|H): asymmetrically disconfirming, negative question 
2. low p(feature|H): almost symmetric, negative question 
3. high p(feature|H): almost symmetric, positive question 
4. very high p(feature|H): asymmetrically disconfirming, positive question 
High Diagnosticity questions:  
5. very low p(feature|H): almost symmetric, negative question 
6. low p(feature|H): asymmetrically confirming, negative question 
7. high p(feature|H): asymmetrically confirming, positive question 
8. very high p(feature|H): almost symmetric, positive question 
Even though perfectly symmetric tests were not investigated, it is interesting that participants did 
not rate strongly asymmetric tests more than almost symmetric ones. In fact, the most preferred 
question (even though only slightly so) in each set was almost symmetrical (questions 3 and 5;  
Figure 1, p.26). Their second experiment used only perfectly symmetrical questions, and therefore it 
is not helpful for the present purpose. In their third experiment, features denoted by probability 
ranges instead of point probabilities were used. The most preferred and the least preferred questions 
were symmetrical (tagged respectively “high-high” and “low-low” in their Figure 4, p.30), with 
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another symmetrical question (tagged “intermediate-intermediate”) and all the asymmetrical ones 
laying in between. Overall, Trope and Bassok’s (1982) study does not suggest any preference for 
asymmetric testing. In later studies (Trope & Thompson, 1997; Cameron & Trope, 2004), it was 
demonstrated  that when individuals try to make accurate judgements about an attitude (e.g. 
“opposing the killing of animals for their fur”) of a target person, the questions they generate are 
affected by their previous, stereotype-based expectancies. If the target person is a member of a 
social category that strongly implies the judged attitude (e.g., “vegetarians”), there is a preference 
for asymmetrically confirming questions (e.g., “do you oppose the killing of mice for research on 
life-saving pharmaceuticals?”). However, when the target person is non-stereotyped as far as the 
investigated attitude is concerned (e.g., “TV producers”), symmetrical questions were preferred 
(e.g., “do you hunt for sport?”).3 The authors argued that the increased a-priori expectancy that a 
stereotyped target shared the attitude raised the subjective probability of receiving the strongly 
diagnostic confirming answers to asymmetric questions. The increase in the probability of the 
strong answers proportionally increased the diagnosticity of asymmetric confirming tests.  In 
conclusion, according to Trope and colleagues, the default tendency in absence of strong prior 
beliefs about the truth of the hypothesis is to prefer symmetrical, fair testing. Asymmetrical 
questions – of the confirming sort – are preferred only when a person is a-priori confident that the 
tested hypothesis is probably true. 
In a very influential study, Skov and Sherman (1986) used “planetary” problems where 
participants were requested to test whether an extraterrestrial being belonged to one of two non-
overlapped and a-priori equiprobable populations. In order to do so, participants had to select two 
yes/no queries about the alien’s features, whose probability distributions in the two populations 
were explicitly described. The authors built the questions by orthogonally crossing three factors: 
                                                 
3 Differently from other studies discussed in this section , Trope and Thompson’s (1997) and Cameron and Trope’s 
(2004) studies were not question-selection or question-evaluation tasks, but question-generation tasks. Subjects were 
free to generate any questions that they considered pertinent (apart from directly asking about the target attitude). 
Accordingly, explicit probabilistic parameters were not available a-priori, and symmetry/asymmetry of questions was 
evaluated ex-post by independent judges. 
 
QUESTION PREFERENCES IN HYPOTHESIS TESTING     11 
 
diagnosticity (low, medium, or high), positivity (positive vs negative), and “extremity” of a 
question, operationalized as the probability of receiving a hypothesis-confirming answer (high, 
medium, low). All of their questions with medium probability of receiving a confirming  answer 
were perfectly symmetrical; those with a high probability of a confirming answer were 
asymmetrically disconfirming, and those with a low probability of receiving a confirming answer 
were asymmetrically confirming queries (Skov & Sherman, 1986, Table 2, p.106). Preferences 
focused upon asymmetrically disconfirming questions,  followed by symmetric questions, and 
finally by asymmetrically confirming questions (respectively 40.0%, 34.3%, 25.8% of choices; data 
extrapolated from Skov & Sherman’s Table 4, p.110; the “both hypotheses” condition is not 
included in these figures). Even though the pattern shows a preference for asymmetric 
disconfirming questions over asymmetric confirming ones, a global preference for asymmetric tests 
over symmetric tests is apparently absent: symmetric queries, that were 1/3 of the available tests, 
accounted for 1/3 of the choices (34.3%). In Skov and Sherman’s “both hypotheses” condition, 
where the participants were told to test both the alternative hypotheses, thus not allowing to classify 
asymmetric questions into confirming or disconfirming ones, symmetric questions (again 1/3 of the 
total) accounted for 45.8% of the choices, against 54.2% of choices for asymmetric questions (2/3 
of the total), showing – if anything – a marginal preference for symmetrical queries.  
In Slowiaczek and colleagues’ (1992) study, Experiments 3a and 3b were the only ones 
investigating the selection of questions (Experiments 1 and 2 focused exclusively on the evaluation 
of responses). No symmetric questions were used in Experiment 3a (that used the “planetary” 
problems introduced by Skov and Sherman, 1986), even though some questions were less 
asymmetric than others (probability parameters are in Slowiaczek et al., 1992, Table 1, p.393). The 
results replicated the preference for the most asymmetric disconfirming queries already shown by 
Skov and Sherman (1986), but are not useful for comparing preferences for symmetric and 
asymmetric questions, contrary to the authors’ claim. Conversely, in Experiment 3b some questions 
were almost symmetric, namely the “no extremity” queries in the contrasts 1, 2, 5, and 6 reported in 
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their Table 6, p.401. Those questions were compared to asymmetric questions, either 
asymmetrically disconfirming (comparisons 1 and 2) or asymmetrically confirming ones 
(comparisons 5 and 6). Furthermore, questions 1 and 5 were positive, and 2 and 6 were negative, 
thus allowing to compare the strength of positive testing to the preferences for 
symmetric/asymmetric testing. Unfortunately, results were ambiguous, and different between the 
two problem contents that were used (the planetary problems, and pseudo-medical problems). In 
comparisons 1 and 2, participants preferred asymmetrically disconfirming queries to symmetric 
queries, both in the positive as well as in the negative conditions, but only in the planetary context. 
In comparisons 5 and 6, negative asymmetrically confirming queries were preferred to negative 
symmetric questions in the medical context, but not in the planetary context. In both contexts, there 
were no differences between the asymmetric and symmetric positive questions (Slowiaczek et al., 
1992, Table 6, p.401).   
To sum up, the actual empirical support for the alleged general preference for asymmetric 
over symmetric queries is scarce and contradictory. Some previous findings hint at a lack of 
preference either for symmetric or asymmetric questions, some others at a possible preference for 
symmetric questions in some contexts, and – eventually –  others still emphasize a preference for 
asymmetric tests.  
2.2 Asymmetric Confirming vs. Asymmetric Disconfirming Queries   
As far as the two sorts of asymmetric queries are concerned, Trope and his colleagues’ 
(1997, 2004) findings are contradictory with respect to those by Skov, Sherman, and their 
colleagues (1986, 1992). Whilst the former found that  people prefer asymmetrically confirming 
queries when background knowledge suggests that there is a high a-priori probability that the tested 
hypothesis is indeed true, and symmetric queries otherwise, the latter found a general preference for 
“extreme tests” – namely, asymmetrically disconfirming queries (see 2.1). Poletiek and Berndsen 
(2000) made an attempt to reconcile those conflicting results by addressing hypotheses testing as a 
risk-taking behaviour, where the “risk” is that of disconfirming one’s own hypothesis. The authors 
 
QUESTION PREFERENCES IN HYPOTHESIS TESTING     13 
 
argued that the choice of a testing strategy is mostly determined by motivational and contextual 
factors that suggest how to weigh the strength of the confirming evidence that is sought by the 
probability of actually finding it. Asymmetrically confirming queries are “high risk” tests, because 
they have a high probability of falsifying the hypothesis (however weakly).  By contrast, 
asymmetrically disconfirming queries are “low risk” tests, because they have a high probability of 
confirming the hypothesis. Poletiek and Berndsen found that when testing scientific hypotheses and 
judicial hypotheses people prefer “high risk” strategies, consistently with the preference for 
asymmetrically confirming tests found by Trope and Thompson (1997) in inquiries concerning 
stereotyped targets. 4 In those contexts people are apparently motivated to avoid type I errors as 
much as possible, at the cost of increasing the risk of type II errors, and choose their preferred tests 
accordingly. By contrast, in Skov and Sherman’s (1986; Slowiaczek et al., 1992) “[…] unrealistic 
test situation, the subject may interpret the instructions as to find as many Fizos [i.e., the name of 
one of the  two groups  of extraterrestrial beings] as possible. The tester may thus be primarily 
concerned with the probability of finding some evidence rather than with the quality of the 
evidence. Consequently, low-risk tests (i.e. minimizing the risk of deciding that the creature is not a 
Fizo) are preferred to risky tests”  (Poletiek & Berndsen, 2000, p. 111). In  light of the available 
data – and of the possible role of background knowledge and motivational factors in shifting 
preferences – an excessive confidence in a “default” preference for asymmetric disconfirming 
queries seems premature.  
3.  Empirical Evidence Concerning Positivity 
A default prevalence of positive testing vs negative testing is less controversial, but some 
conflicting results are still present in the literature. Preferences for positive tests were observed in 
the majority of empirical works that used Wason’s 2-4-6 task (1960) and selection task (1966, 
                                                 
4 A weakness in Poletiek and Berndsen’s study is that – instead of giving participants the explicit probabilistic 
parameters of different tests –  they informally described the tests’ properties: participants were told to choose between 
seeking strong confirming evidence, with a low probability of actually finding it, or seeking weak confirming evidence, 
with a high probability of finding it. In our view, showing that people, when explicitly asked, say that they would rather 
look for strong evidence even though improbable, does not prove that they are able to tell a “high risk” test,  when they 
actually see one. 
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1968). Most 2–4–6 studies showed a strong tendency to adopt a positive testing attitude. Only a 
subset of participants ever turned to negative testing, and most often they did so in later stages of 
the task, when ill-posed confidence had already been apportioned on an improper hypothesis 
(Kareev, Halberstadt, & Shafir, 1993; Klayman & Ha, 1987, 1989; Rossi, Caverni, & Girotto, 2001; 
Spellman, Lopez, & Smith, 1999; Vallée-Tourangeau, Austin, & Ramkin, 1995; Cherubini, 
Castelvecchio, & Cherubini, 2005; Gale & Ball, 2006). We cannot fully account here for the huge 
amount of studies on Wason’s selection task. However, apart from special settings where the 
antecedent and consequent of the tested rule are experienced as more common than their negations 
(Oaksford & Chater, 2003), or where the negated consequent is made more salient (e.g., Sperber, 
Cara, & Girotto, 1995), or in the various “deontic” versions of the task (e.g., Cheng & Holyoak, 
1985), the negative testing strategy denoted by the explicit selection of the ¬q cards is uncommon. 
For example, in an interesting version of the task where participants had to pay to acquire 
information and accuracy was incentivised, the ¬q choices accounted for as few as 6.9% of all 
acquisitions, even though they were optimal selections for increasing the participants’ own 
monetary outcomes (Jones & Sugden, 2001).  
In question-selection and question-evaluation studies, however, findings concerning positive 
testing are more controversial. Trope and Bassok (1982) did not observe it in their Experiment 1, 
and only found a weak preference for positive tests in their Experiment 2. Baron et al. (1988)  
found a significant “congruence bias” – equivalent to positive testing – in their Experiments 1 and 
2, where the participants focused on a given hypothesis; however, the bias weakened (Experiment 
3) or disappeared (Experiments 4-5) where all the alternative hypotheses where made more salient 
to participants. Skov & Sherman (1986) found more compelling evidence of a preference for 
positive testing in question-selection tasks: 60.1% of selected questions in their study were positive 
(data extrapolated from their Table 4, p.110). In Slowiaczek et al’s Experiment 3a a similar rate was 
found (63% Table 5, p.401). Unfortunately, neither Trope and Thompson (1997) nor Cameron and 
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Trope (2004) reported the proportion of questions generated by their participants that were positive 
or negative.  
4.  Goals of the Present Study 
The present study is an empirical investigation of the asymmetric testing and positive testing 
strategies, aimed at clarifying some of the ambiguities that are present in previous literature. 
Because inconsistencies across the studies have been attributed to different methodologies and 
problem contents (e.g., Poletiek & Berndsen, 2000), we chose to use minimally contextualized, 
abstract question-selection or question-evaluation tasks, described by fully explicit probabilistic 
information (question-generation tasks are less precise as far as the control of probabilistic and 
informational parameters are concerned). In  light of the surprising lack of direct empirical evidence 
in support of the widespread idea that asymmetric testing is generally preferred to symmetric 
testing, our first goal was to directly compare preferences for symmetric and asymmetric questions 
(Experiments 1 to 3). By orthogonally factoring the positivity/negativity of questions, we also 
compared the relative strengths of the positive testing and asymmetric testing tendencies, and 
gathered further data concerning the extent of the positive testing tendency in question-selection 
(Experiment 1) and question-evaluation (Experiments 2, 3, 4) tasks. Finally, we purported to check 
whether preferences among asymmetric questions privileged either the confirming (e.g., Trope & 
Thompson, 1997) or the disconfirming ones (e.g., Skov & Sherman, 1986) (Experiments 1 to 4).   
We strived to  control most of the formal properties of the questions that might have had a bearing 
on their choice, as much as possible. Scholars interested in the replication or reinterpretation of the 
results will find examples of the instructions and all the relevant parameters of the different 
problems that we used in extensive Appendices (A to G).  
5. Experiments 1 and 2 
5.1 Materials, Design and Procedure 
 Experiments 1 and 2 differed only in their dependent variable and – consequently – in part 
of the instructions. The procedure, materials, and experimental design were the same, and the 
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participants were drawn from the same pool. In each of a series of eight paper-and-pencil problems 
two decks of cards were described, “Deck A” and “Deck B”. Each one had 100 cards. Each card 
showed zero to four independent geometric figures, selected among  triangles, circles, squares or 
pentagons. In each problem a table synthesized the distribution of cards with each figure in each 
deck (see an example in Appendix A).  
Participants were told that the experimenter drew a card at random from a deck. They were then 
shown four questions, concerning the presence of the four features on the card: “is there a triangle 
on the card?”, “is there a square on the card?”, “is there a circle on the card?”, “is there a pentagon 
on the card?”. They had to select (Experiment 1) or rank in order (Experiment 2) the questions that 
they deemed most useful for surmising whether the card was more probably drawn from Deck A 
(for one group of participants), or from Deck B (for a second group). In all the problems the 
distribution of figures in the decks was such that two questions were symmetric, and two 
asymmetric. Orthogonally, in each problem two questions were negative, and two were positive. 
Accordingly, in each problem there was a symmetric positive question, a symmetric negative 
question (with LR values equal to the previous one), an asymmetric positive question, and an 
asymmetric negative question (with LR values equal to the previous one). The eight problem 
versions (see Appendix B) originated from balancing whether the asymmetric questions had either a 
larger, smaller or equal LR (and Information Gain, IG) than the symmetric questions, for each 
possible answer (same LR for “yes”, decreased LR for “no”; same LR for “yes”, increased LR for 
“no”; same LR for “no”, decreased LR for “yes”; same LR for “no”, increased LR for “yes”; LR 
decreased for both responses; LR increased for both responses; LR increased for “yes”, and 
decreased for “no”; LR decreased for “yes”, and increased for “no”; see the eight problems in the 
Appendix C). Thanks to this systematic balancing, observed preferences either for symmetric or 
asymmetric questions – averaged across the eight problems – could not be caused by a perceived 
increment or decrement of the actual strength of the possible answers to questions. As a further 
caution, we balanced (even though not orthogonally with respect to the previous balancing), the 
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association of symmetric and asymmetric questions with extreme probabilities: that is, in four 
problems the most extreme probabilities (considering both hypotheses) were associated with 
symmetric questions, whereas in the other four problems they were associated with the asymmetric 
ones. This manipulation also obtained an orthogonal balancing, across the problems, of the 
positivity/negativity of an asymmetric test and its being either confirmatory or disconfirmatory 
(four questions each for positive confirming, positive disconfirming, negative confirming, and 
negative disconfirming queries; see Appendix C). Unfortunately, having given priority to these 
balancing factors for theoretical reasons (i.e., according to Trope and colleagues, 1997, 2004, 
people can be sensitive to increments or decrements in the informative value of an answer; and, 
according to Skov & Sherman, 1986, and Slowiaczek and colleagues, 1992, people are mostly 
insensitive to the LR of answers, but are attracted by questions with extreme probabilities), we 
could not fully balance the diagnosticity of the questions. In five problems, symmetric questions 
were on average more informative than asymmetric questions, whereas in only three  problems 
asymmetric questions were more informative than symmetric ones (see Appendix C). However, we 
planned to statistically check post-hoc whether this formal parameter affected choices.  
Booklets containing general instructions (comprising two easy examples) and the eight 
experimental problems (one per page) were handed out individually to each participant. The 
pseudo-random order of presentation of the eight problems was different for each participant. As a 
further balancing factor, in each Experiment half of the participants received problem versions 
where they where asked to check whether the card had been drawn more probably from Deck A 
than from Deck B (focal hypothesis: Deck A), whereas the other half was asked to check whether 
the card had been drawn more probably from Deck B than from Deck A (focal hypothesis: Deck B). 
Thanks to this manipulation, positive and negative questions were matched for diagnosticity 
between groups: each question that was positive when focusing on Deck A was negative when 
focusing on Deck B, with most of its remaining characteristics (symmetry, extremity, diagnosticity) 
being kept constant (apart from being confirmatory vs disconfirmatory: e.g., asymmetric positive 
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confirming questions for Deck A were asymmetric negative disconfirming ones when focusing on 
Deck B, and so on; see appendix C).  
Participants were asked individually for informed consent, and, if they consented, were 
tested individually or in small groups (in the latter case, they could not consult each other) in quiet 
environments (university libraries or study rooms). They were told that they could proceed at their 
own pace in responding to the problems.  
5.2 Experiment 1 
5.2.1 Participants. 
A total of 30 volunteers (15 female, 15 male, mean age: 23.8 years, range 18-28 years; mean 
education: 17, SD 1.9) took part in the study. They were mostly undergraduate students from the 
university of Milano-Bicocca. 
5.2.2 Dependent variables.  
Participants were instructed to select, out of the four that were presented, the two questions 
that they deemed most useful. This was not a ranked, but an “all or none” judgement, similar to the 
dependent variable used by Skov and Sherman (1986), but different from that used by Trope and 
Bassok (1982). Secondly,  for each problem participants were asked to express their degree of 
confidence in the correctness of their selections on a rating scale graded 1 to 7, with 1 
corresponding to “least confident” and 7 to “most confident”. 
5.2.3 Results and analyses. 
Table 1 shows the raw number of total choices (and proportions) as a function of positivity 
and asymmetry of the questions. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
There is no reliable preference for symmetric questions over asymmetric ones, or vice-versa 
(exact binomial test; symmetric questions: 239; asymmetric questions: 241; p = 0.96). By contrast, 
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positive questions were preferred to negative ones (positive questions: 375; negative questions: 105; 
p < 0.001). The two factors did not interact (χ2 = 0.08; df = 1; exact p = 0.83). More appropriate 
analyses, however, considered the six possible patterns of choices available to participants for each 
problem: choosing the two positive questions, the two negative ones, the two symmetric ones, the 
two asymmetric ones, the positive symmetric one plus the negative asymmetric one, or the positive 
asymmetric one and the negative symmetric one. Each participant was assigned a score ranging 
from 0 to 8 for each pattern of choice, by counting its occurrence over the eight problems. Means 
and standard deviations are shown in table 2. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 shows the exact p values of each comparison among the six possible patterns, by 
means of Wilcoxon non-parametric exact tests. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Results show three ranks of preferences. Selecting the two positive questions (one 
symmetric and one asymmetric) in each problem is the most common tendency, followed by 
selecting either the two symmetric or the two asymmetric questions (one positive, and one 
negative), with no reliable differences between the two of them. Other choices, consisting in 
choosing either the two negative questions, or the positive symmetric question and negative 
asymmetric question, or the positive asymmetric question and negative symmetric question, are 
residuals, without differences among the three of them. 
Table 4 shows the raw numbers (and proportions) of asymmetric choices as a function of 
positivity/negativity and of the type of asymmetry (confirmatory vs disconfirmatory).  
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
There is no reliable preference for either asymmetric confirming or asymmetric 
disconfirming questions (120 vs 121 choices). Positive choices are reliably more than negative 
ones, consistently with overall results (exact binomial test, p < 0.001). The interaction is not 
significant (χ2 = 2.28; df = 1; exact 2-tailed p = 0.16).  
Correlations with measures of diagnosticity were computed on data aggregated across 
participants. The number of times each question was chosen correlated reliably with both measures 
of diagnosticity that we used: mean Weight of Evidence (Spearman’s r = 0.53, N=32, p<0.005) and 
expected Information Gain (r = 0.54, p<0.005).  
Mean confidence across the problems did not correlate reliably with the score attained in 
each one of the six possible patterns of choice. However, mean confidence correlated positively 
(Pearson’s r = 0.47, p <0.01) with the number of symmetric positive questions selected by each 
participant, and negatively (r = -0.40, p < 0.05) with the number of negative asymmetric questions 
selected by each participant.  
5.2.4 Discussion. 
The results are clear cut, and need little interpretation. Most notably, we observed a strong 
tendency to select positive questions. The more positive symmetric questions people choose, the 
more they were confident in the correctness of their choice, and vice-versa for negative asymmetric 
questions. Secondly, there was a weaker tendency to select either two symmetric questions, or two 
asymmetric ones, with no differences between them. Among the asymmetric choices, there is no 
apparent  preference either for confirming or for disconfirming questions. Overall, results confirm 
and strengthen previous literature concerning the preference for positive over negative questions in 
hypothesis testing. The correlation between the diagnosticity of each question in each problem and 
the number of times it was chosen – consistent with previous literature (e.g., Trope & Bassok, 
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1982) – does not invalidate the finding concerning preferences for positive tests, because positive 
and negative queries were balanced for diagnosticity between groups. On the other hand, sensitivity 
to diagnosticity might have shifted preferences toward symmetric questions.  In five problems out 
of eight, symmetric questions were more informative than asymmetric ones. This notwithstanding, 
no significant preference either for symmetric or asymmetric questions was observed. Furthermore, 
no differences between the asymmetric confirming and disconfirming questions were observed. 
These negative findings are in contrast with those  discussed in the introduction: Trope and his 
associates (Trope & Thompson, 1997; Cameron & Trope, 2004) found preferences for symmetric 
questions where there was no strong a-priori belief in the hypothesis, and preferences for 
asymmetrically confirming questions where there was a strong a-priori belief in the hypothesis; 
Poletiek and Berndsen (2000) found preferences for asymmetrically confirming questions in the 
scientific and judicial domains; Skov and Sherman (1986) found preferences for asymmetrically 
disconfirming questions in problems contextualized as planetary explorations; Slowiaczek et al. 
(1992) found the same in the same context, but ambiguous results when comparing the planetary 
context to pseudo-medical problems.  These findings, being negative, will need further replication 
before any discussion of the inconsistencies is warranted.  
5.3 Experiment 2 
The dependent variable in Experiment 1 – choosing the two best questions – together with 
the observed strong preference for choosing the two positive questions (one of which was 
symmetric, and the other asymmetric), might have concealed some subtle differences of preference 
for symmetric and asymmetric questions. Experiment 2 explores this possibility. It is identical to 
Experiment 1 except for its dependent variable: instead of asking participants to choose the two best 
questions, we asked them to rank the four questions in order of usefulness (1 = most useful, 4 = 
least useful), a procedure that is similar to that used by Trope and Bassok (1982). In the instructions 
for the task we clarified that ties could be indicated by assigning the same rank to two or more 
questions. 
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5.3.1 Participants. 
A total of 30 volunteers (16 female, 14 male, mean age: 23.8 years, range 19-38 years; mean 
education: 16, SD 2.5) took part in the study. 
5.3.2 Results and analyses. 
Table 5 shows the mean ranks assigned by participants to each question (averaged over the 
eight problems). A set of two-tailed Wilcoxon exact tests confirmed that positive questions were 
preferred to negative questions (p = 0.001), but it also showed that symmetric questions were 
apparently preferred to asymmetric ones (p = 0.002). 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Positive symmetric questions were rated more useful than positive asymmetric (p = 0.002), 
negative symmetric (p < 0.001) and negative asymmetric ones (p < 0.001). Positive asymmetric 
questions were preferred to negative symmetric ones (p = 0.03) and negative asymmetric ones (p = 
0.002). Finally, negative symmetric questions were ranked more important than negative 
asymmetric ones (p = 0.04). By aggregating data across participants, however,  we found reliable 
negative correlations between the mean rank attributed to each questions and its diagnosticity 
(Pearson’s r = -0.58, N=32, p <0.001; results do not differ among the two alternative measures of 
diagnosticity that we used). This finding, together with the fact that, in the stimuli, symmetric 
questions where more diagnostic than asymmetric ones in five problems out of eight, might have 
led to an artificial conflation of the observed preference for symmetric questions. A correlation 
might of course also be read the opposite way around: preferences for symmetric questions, that had 
a slight advantage in diagnosticity, could have contributed to the observed correlation. In order to 
disentangle these two interpretations we divided post-hoc the 8 problems in two groups: those 
where symmetric questions were more diagnostic (problems 2 to 6), and those where they were less 
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diagnostic (problems 1, 7, 8). The mean ratings of symmetric and asymmetric questions in the two 
groups are reported in Table 6. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
insert Table 6 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Two two-tailed Wilcoxon exact tests showed that symmetric questions were significantly 
preferred in the problems where they were more informative (p<0.001), but asymmetric ones were 
preferred in the problems where the symmetric questions were less informative (p =0.003). These 
post hoc tests are spurious, since dividing post-hoc the problems in two unequal groups sacrifices 
some of the balancing factors. Considering however that their results are consistent with the 
previously known tendency to prefer questions with a high diagnosticity (e.g., Trope & Bassok, 
1982; Garcia-Marques, Sherman, Palma-Oliveira, 2001), in our view it is acceptable evidence that 
the apparent preference for symmetric questions reported above is – at least partly – an artifact 
generated by the differences in the  diagnosticity of the problems.  
Table 7 shows the mean ranks assigned by participants to asymmetric questions only, as a 
function of their positivity/negativity and of their type (confirmatory vs disconfirmatory).  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
insert Table 7 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Two two-tailed Wilcoxon exact tests confirmed, once again, that positive questions were 
preferred to negative ones (p<0.001), whereas there were no significant differences between 
confirming and disconfirming asymmetric queries.  
Finally, there were no significant correlations among mean confidence and the ranks 
assigned to each question, or their diagnosticity.  
5.3.3 Discussion. 
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The results of Experiment 2 mostly replicate those of Experiment 1, thus weakening the 
concern that the lack of preferences either for symmetric or asymmetric questions might have been 
induced by the type of dependent variable used in the former experiment. The preference for 
positive questions is replicated, and so is the lack of preference for asymmetric questions. Even 
though raw data show a preference for symmetric questions, this finding is probably an artefact 
accounted for by the participants’ sensitivity to the diagnosticity of the questions. Among 
asymmetric questions, there are no preferences either for confirmatory or disconfirmatory ones, in 
keeping with Experiment 1 and contrary to previous studies showing such preferences (see the 
discussion of Experiment 1 and the introduction). Apparently, in tasks where the effects of domain-
related previous knowledge is minimized, people are  indifferent  to whether a question is 
symmetric or asymmetric, and all the more they are indifferent to whether an asymmetric question 
is confirmatory or disconfirmatory. By contrast, even in those tasks people are sensitive to the 
diagnosticity of questions, and they are appealed by positive questions.   
6. Experiment 3 
Klaus Fiedler, commenting on a previous draft of this study, correctly noticed that,  with the 
exception of problem 3, the numerals describing the asymmetric queries in Experiment 1 and 2 
were more complex than those describing the symmetric queries, that were rounded to the tens (e.g., 
80%, 20%, 90%, vs  95%, 54%, 46%, etc.; see Appendix B). Rounded numerals might have been 
more appealing to participants, and easier to process. This feature might have contributed to the 
shift of preferences to symmetric questions, and might have concealed possible preferences for 
asymmetric testing. In Experiment 3 we removed that confounding. The Experiment’s design and 
procedure were exactly the same as in Experiment 2, but we used new problems, none of which 
used rounded numerals in their probability parameters. The new problems and their parameters  are 
reported in Appendices D and E.  
6.1 Participants 
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A total of 48 volunteers (29 females, 19 males, mean age: 23.4 years, range 20-34 years; 
mean education: 16.5 years, SD 1.6) took part in the study. They were mostly undergraduate and 
graduate students from the University of Milano-Bicocca (Northern Italy) and from the University 
of Chieti (Southern Italy). 
6.2 Results and Analyses 
Table 8 shows the mean ranks assigned by participants to each question (averaged over the 
eight problems). 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
insert Table 8 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
A set of two-tailed Wilcoxon exact tests confirmed that positive questions were preferred to 
negative questions (p < 0.001), and that symmetric questions were apparently preferred to 
asymmetric ones (p = 0.03), fully replicating the main findings of Experiment 2.  Positive 
symmetric questions were rated marginally more useful than positive asymmetric ones (p = 0.06), 
and significantly more useful than negative symmetric and asymmetric ones (p < 0.001 for both 
comparisons). Positive asymmetric questions were preferred to negative symmetric and asymmetric 
ones (p < 0.001). There were no differences between negative symmetric and asymmetric questions.  
As occurred in the previous two experiments, however,  the diagnosticity of questions possibly 
contributed to choices, as shown by a significant negative correlation between the mean rating of 
each question (across participants) and its diagnosticity (r =-0.55, p<0.001; the results are the same 
for the two alternative measures of diagnosticity that we used). Accordingly, we compared 
symmetric and asymmetric queries in the two subgroups of problems were symmetric queries were 
more informative (problems 2 to 6) or less informative (problems 1, 7, 8). Similarly to Experiment 
2, we found that each type of question was reliably preferred in the group of problems where it was 
more diagnostic (Wilcoxon exact tests; p =0.003 for the five problems where symmetric questions 
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are more informative, and p<0.001 where asymmetric questions are the more informative ones). 
Mean ratings are shown in Table 9.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
insert Table 9 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
With the caveats associated to this way of splitting problems post-hoc into two unbalanced 
groups, this finding suggests that the preference for symmetric questions might – at least partly – be 
an artefact induced by the different diagnosticity of queries.  
Table 10 shows the mean ranks assigned by participants to asymmetric questions only, as a 
function of their positivity/negativity and of their type (confirmatory vs disconfirmatory).  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
insert Table 10 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Two two-tailed Wilcoxon exact tests confirmed that positive questions were preferred to 
negative ones (p<0.001), whereas there were no significant differences between confirming and 
disconfirming asymmetric queries, in full compliance with the previous Experiments.  
There was no significant correlation among mean confidence and the rank assigned to each 
question. 
6.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 1 and 2 symmetric questions were described by easy probability parameters 
rounded to the tens, whereas asymmetric questions were almost always described by more complex 
numerals. This might have induced a shift of preference towards symmetric questions, that in turn 
might have concealed  preferences for asymmetric testing. In Experiment 3 we removed that 
concern, and nonetheless we found no preference whatsoever for asymmetric tests. If anything, 
symmetric tests were again preferred, however – as occurred in Experiment 2 – this could have 
been a collateral effect of their slightly greater diagnosticity, that significantly correlated with the 
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participants’ answers. Focusing on asymmetric queries, once again we did not find any reliable 
difference of preferences between confirmatory and disconfirmatory ones. 
7. Experiment 4 
 In the three previous Experiments, two negative findings were recurrently observed, 
suggesting that they are worth of notice. Firstly, the lack of preferences for asymmetric queries over 
symmetric ones conflicts with previous claims (e.g., Slowiaczek et al., 1992). In fact, however, it  is 
not in strong contrast with empirical data of  previous studies that were inconclusive as far as this 
comparison was concerned (see the introduction). The second negative result is more puzzling. 
Previous studies consistently showed that – where asymmetric questions were chosen or generated 
– systematic preferences were observed either for confirmatory (Trope & Thompson, 1997; 
Cameron & Trope, 2004) or for disconfirmatory queries (Skov & Sherman, 1986; Slowiaczek et al., 
1992). This was not the case in the Experiments 1, 2 and 3. In aggregated form, participants’ 
choices were indifferent to the confirming or disconfirming valence of the asymmetric questions. 
The designs of Experiments 1 to 3 might not have afforded the necessary power for detecting subtle 
differences between different sorts of asymmetric queries. The presence of two symmetric and two 
asymmetric questions in each problem implies that participants who ranked the two positive 
questions as the first and second in order of importance (a strong tendency, as shown by the 
comparisons between positive and negative queries) were also ranking highest a symmetric and an 
asymmetric question, the latter being, across problems and groups of participants, half the time  
confirming, and half the time disconfirming. This feature might have led to an artifactual balance of 
the preferences for confirming and disconfirming asymmetric questions. In order to remove this 
possible confusion, in Experiment 4 we did not use symmetric questions. All of the four questions 
available in each problem were asymmetric, two of them negative and two positive, and – across 
problems – half of them confirmatory, and the other half disconfirmatory. The goal was to detect 
preferences either for confirming or disconfirming questions that were possibly concealed by 
previous designs.  
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7.1 Participants 
A total of 48 volunteers (29 females, 19 males, mean age: 23.4 years, range 20-34 years; 
mean education: 16.5 years, SD 1.6) took part in the study. They were mostly undergraduate and 
graduate students from the University of Milano-Bicocca and from the University of Chieti. 
7.2 Design and Procedure 
The procedure, setting and instructions to the participants were the same as in Experiments 2 
and 3. Stimuli were built by systematically varying the value of the most extreme probability of 
each feature under the two alternative hypotheses, and its association either with the focal 
hypothesis, or with the alternative one. For the former manipulation, probabilities were classified 
into four groups: very high (p>0.9), high (0.5<p<0.9), low (0.5>p>0.1), and very low (p<0.1). A 
feature probability is extreme when it is further removed from .5 than the corresponding probability 
under the alternative hypothesis. For example, if a circle has a probability of 0.68 of being present 
in Deck A, and 0.18 in Deck B, and the participant is focusing on Deck A, the most extreme 
probability (0.18) is in the “low” range, and  is associated to the non-focal hypothesis. As in another 
example, if p(square|Deck A) = 0.98, and p(square|Deck B) =0.89, the extreme probability (0.98) is 
in the “very high” range, and  is associated to the focal hypothesis (see Appendix F). Questions 
classified as “low” or “very low” ranges of extreme probability are negative and disconfirming if 
the extreme is associated to the focal hypothesis. They are positive and confirming if the extreme is 
associated to the non-focal hypothesis. Vice-versa, questions classified as “high” or “very high” are 
positive and disconfirming if the extreme is associated to the focal hypothesis and negative and 
confirming if it is associated to the non-focal hypothesis. Thus, by manipulating the association of 
the extreme probability either to the focal or to the non-focal hypothesis, and its magnitude, we also 
attained the basic positivity/negativity x type of asymmetry design (see Appendix G). Furthermore, 
by varying probabilities over four magnitudes (instead of two: i.e., p >0.5 vs p <0.5), we purported 
to explore whether the absolute probability values also had an effect on preferences. In order to 
fully balance the questions in the four ranges of extreme probability we had to devise two sets of 
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four problems each, that – unavoidably – also differed between them in diagnosticity. Four 
problems had highly diagnostic questions, whilst the other four problems had less diagnostic 
questions (expected W.E.: 4.15 vs 0.87). However,  the diagnosticity of questions within each 
problem was kept constant.   
7.3 Results and Analyses 
Results are shown in Table 11.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
insert Table 11 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Disconfirmatory questions were preferred to confirmatory ones, as found by Skov and 
Sherman (1986) and Slowiaczek et al. (1992), only for positive questions. For negative questions, 
confirmatory tests were deemed more important than disconfirmatory ones. The positivity by type 
of asymmetry interaction that is apparent in the table is best described by the following pattern of 
significant differences: positive disconfirming questions >p =0.011 positive confirming >p =0.014 
negative confirming >p =0.034 negative disconfirming (all of the remaining pairwise comparisons 
between the four types of questions were also significant; these and the following p values – unless 
otherwise stated – were obtained from 2-tailed Wilcoxon exact tests). Quite against immediate 
intuition, this pattern indeed suggests that participants were little – if at all – affected by the 
confirming or disconfirming valence of an asymmetrical question.  They were more likely affected 
by the magnitude of the probability of a feature under the focal hypothesis p(E|H). Elementary 
algebra shows that,  diagnosticity of questions being equal, positive disconfirming questions have 
necessarily a p(E|H) greater than positive confirming questions, and negative confirming questions 
have necessarily a p(E|H) greater than negative disconfirming ones. 5 Namely, the most preferred 
positive disconfirming questions had, on average, a p(E|H) greater than the second-rated positive 
                                                 
5 In our design,  some positive confirming questions had a p(E|H) greater than some positive disconfirming questions 
occurring in different problems, but this occurred because those questions had different diagnosticity (see Appendices F 
and G).  
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confirming ones. The third rank in order of importance was assigned to negative confirming 
questions, with a  p(E|H) greater than that of negative disconfirming ones. The latter were deemed 
the least important queries. Analyses considering the four ranges of magnitude of the extreme 
probabilities and their association either to the focal or to the alternative hypothesis corroborated 
and further specified this reading. The results are shown in Table 12.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
insert Table 12 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In the very high and high extremity ranges, questions were deemed more important where 
the extreme was associated to the focal hypothesis (positive disconfirming questions), than to the 
non-focal one (negative confirming questions) (p = 0.001 and p <0.001, respectively). Very high-
extreme and high-extreme questions did not differ between them when they were positive, whilst 
there was a preference for very high-extreme over high-extreme negative questions (p =0.044). In 
the low and very low extreme-probability ranges, the preferred questions were those whose extreme 
probabilities were associated to the non-focal hypothesis (positive confirmatory questions) (p<0.001 
and p = 0.005, respectively). The very low-extreme and low-extreme questions did not differ 
between them when they were associated to the focal hypothesis (i.e., they were negative), whilst 
they differed significantly when they were associated to the non-focal hypothesis (and hence, they 
were positive questions, the low extreme questions with p(E|H) higher than very low extreme 
questions; p =0.003). Altogether, it seems that it was not extremity under the focal hypothesis that 
drove participants’ preferences, pace Skov & Sherman (1986): more simply, participants paid heed 
to the magnitude of p(E|H), considering mostly unimportant those questions where p(E|H) was very 
low, and increasingly important questions with higher p(E|H), both in the negative and in the 
positive domain.  In line with the previous considerations, p(E|H) significantly correlated with the 
mean rank assigned to each one of the 32 questions (Pearson r = -0.71, p<0.001), whereas p(E|¬H) 
did not (r =-0.18, not significant), also implying that  participants were not maximizing p(E) in 
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general, but specifically focused on p(E|H). Even though unorthodox for ordinal data, linear 
regression is helpful for describing the two main findings of Experiment 4. A linear regression 
model that uses as predictors p(E|H) and the positivity of the question [operationalized into a 
continuous measure by computing the difference p(E|H) - p(E|¬H), obtaining positive values for 
positive questions and negative values for negative ones] significantly fits the data (r =0.77; 
r2=0.59; p<0.001), with the following parameters: 
mean rank = 2.28 - 0.57 p(E|H) - 0.42 [ p(E|H)- p(E|¬H)] 
By adding to the model, as predictors, p(E|¬H), the LR of the confirming answer, the LR of the 
disconfirming answer, or any combination of them, fitness is not significantly improved.  
Finally, analyses of the confidence ratings did not yield any interesting result. 
7.4 Discussion 
Experiment 4 confirms the preference for positive questions already observed in the 
previous Experiments. It also shows that, for asymmetric questions, positivity/negativity interacts 
with the confirming/disconfirming valence of the question. Positive disconfirmatory questions are 
rated more important than positive confirmatory ones, whereas in the negative domain the opposite 
is true, with confirmatory questions ranking above disconfirmatory ones. This pattern of 
preferences seems inconsistent with the alleged preference to test features with extreme 
probabilities under the focal hypothesis, as suggested by Skov and Sherman (1986). Extremity 
under the focal hypothesis attracts preferences only when the extreme value is high or very high. 
When it is low or very low, questions are preferred where the extreme probability is associated to 
the non-focal hypothesis, thus resulting in positive, confirming questions. In our view, the pattern is 
best described by assuming that participants’ preferences were mostly driven by two easily 
accessible heuristic clues: positivity of the question, that is p(E|H)>p(E|¬H), and the magnitude of 
p(E|H), as described by a linear regression where these two features were the best predictors of 
responses. In these abstract tasks participants’ choices – on the whole – are not strongly affected by 
sophisticated features such as the confirming or disconfirming valence of a question (that would 
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suggest that they are estimating ex-ante the epistemic strengths of its answers), or by the extremity 
of a feature’s probability under one of the two hypotheses (that would suggest that they are trying to 
maximize either the probability of a confirming, or of a disconfirming response). More simply, 
participants prefer testing features that are typical of true instances of the focal hypothesis: typical 
both in a relative sense, as shown by preferences for questions where p(E|H)>p(E|¬H) (i.e., positive 
testing), as well as in an absolute sense, as shown by the increasing preferences for questions with 
increasing p(E|H).  
8. General Discussion 
The study of spontaneous hypothesis-testing strategies has a long history in cognitive 
psychology, dating back to its early years (e.g. Wason, 1960). It can improve our understanding of 
how beliefs and opinions are – properly or improperly – built, maintained, or rejected. Preferences 
for different sorts of questions, by interacting with the environment and with psychological 
tendencies affecting the generation and evaluation of responses, sometimes result in loss of 
information and in an increased probability of errors, namely “confirmation biases” (e.g., 
Nickerson, 1998; McKenzie, 2004). Currently we know a great deal about human hypothesis-
testing strategies, and about their consequences. Yet, some issues still remain obscure. First of all, 
close scrutiny of previous studies showed that they are inconclusive with regards to the alleged 
(e.g., Slowiaczek et al., 1992) preference for  asymmetric questions – i.e., questions that can 
confirm a focal hypothesis more strongly than they can falsify it, or vice-versa – over symmetric 
ones. Secondly, studies on preferences for different sorts of asymmetric questions have conflicting 
results: some reported preferences for confirmatory queries (e.g. Trope & Thompson, 1997), as 
opposed to others reporting preferences for disconfirmatory ones (e.g., Skov & Sherman, 1986). 
Poletiek and Berndsen (2000) attributed these differences to context-driven motivations and prior 
knowledge. As a matter of fact, across studies, the problem contents ranged from social inferences 
concerning the attitudes of a target person (e.g., Trope & Thompson, 1997), to planetary 
explorations (e.g., Skov & Sherman, 1986), to pseudo-medical, pseudo-scientific, or pseudo-judicial 
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problems (e.g., Slowiaczek et al., 1992; Baron et al., 1988: Poletiek & Berndsen, 2000), possibly 
raising a host of different prior knowledge-based considerations. Thirdly and finally, even though 
evidence in support of positive testing – i.e., a preference for testing features that are more 
consistent with the truth of a focal hypothesis than with its falsity – is less controversial (but see 
Trope & Bassok, 1982, and Baron et al., 1988),  its relative strength has not been compared to 
asymmetric testing yet. Such a comparison is theoretically relevant. Asymmetric testing strategies 
are attributed either to the ability to anticipate the confirming or falsificatory strength of an answer, 
and to balance it with its subjective probability (Trope & Thompson, 1997; Cameron & Trope, 
2004; Poletiek & Berndsen, 2000), or to the ability to estimate and maximize the probability of 
receiving a confirming answer (Skov & Sherman, 1986; Slowiaczek et al., 1992). They require 
fairly sophisticated cognitive judgements. By contrast, positive testing is a quite simple strategy: it 
checks for features that are more typical of the focal hypothesis than of its alternative. Comparisons 
of the relative strengths of positive and asymmetric testing can accordingly help understand  
whether spontaneous hypothesis-testing strategies in unfamiliar, abstract settings, are mostly 
intuitive judgments, or mostly analytical ones, in terms of the contraposition proposed by the 
current dual-process theories of human thinking (e.g., Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002).  
In four experiments we addressed the three issues described above. We minimized the role 
of previous knowledge and contextual factors by using unfamiliar, abstract tasks. Participants had to 
select or evaluate questions about a card’s features, in order to infer from which of two decks it had 
been drawn. The probability of occurrence of each feature in the cards of each deck was explicitly 
given. In Experiments 1 to 3 we systematically compared  positive symmetric, positive asymmetric, 
negative symmetric, and negative asymmetric questions, while balancing the informational value of 
the responses, the confirming or disconfirming nature of the asymmetric queries, and the 
association of very high or very low probabilities either to symmetric or to asymmetric queries. In 
Experiment 1 participants had to select the two most important questions in each problem (similarly 
to Skov & Sherman, 1986), whereas in Experiment 2 and 3 they had to rank the questions in order 
 
QUESTION PREFERENCES IN HYPOTHESIS TESTING     34 
 
of importance (similarly to Trope & Bassok, 1982). Experiment 3 adjusted for a possible confound 
present in Experiments 1 and 2, by balancing the complexity of the numerals that described the 
probabilities associated to each feature. The results were consistent throughout the three 
experiments. A strong preference for positive questions was observed. By contrast, no preference 
for asymmetric questions was observed. If anything, there were significant preferences for 
symmetric questions (Experiments 2 and 3), even though they were probably an artefact originating 
from a slight advantage in diagnosticity of symmetric over asymmetric queries. By focusing 
analyses on asymmetric queries only, we did not find any systematic preference either for 
confirming, or for disconfirming queries. In Experiments 1 to 3, aggregated data showed that people 
were sensitive to the positivity/negativity of questions, and to their diagnosticity, but that they were 
mostly unaffected by the symmetry/asymmetry, and – internally to asymmetric questions – by their 
disconfirming or confirming valence. However, Experiments 1-3, specifically designed for 
comparing positive testing to asymmetric testing, might not have afforded enough power to detect 
subtle differences between asymmetric queries of different sorts. Experiment 4 complemented them 
by investigating asymmetric queries only, and by varying systematically their positivity/negativity, 
their confirmatory/falsificatory valence, and, embedded in that design, the magnitude of the 
probability parameters describing each questions. Its results confirmed a robust preference for 
positive questions over negative ones. They also showed an interaction: positive disconfirming 
questions were preferred to positive confirming ones, whereas negative confirming questions were 
rated more important than negative disconfirming ones. This trend – as far as we know – was never 
observed before: previous studies either detected a preference for confirmatory questions (e.g., 
Trope & Thompson, 1997), or for disconfirmatory questions (e.g., Skov & Sherman, 1986), but we 
found no reports of a preference reversals depending on the positivity/negativity of the question. 
Close scrutiny of the data suggested that this interaction originated from the participants’ preference 
for testing features with relatively high probabilities under the focal hypothesis, a heuristic 
behaviour reminiscent of “pseudodiagnostic” judgements (e.g., Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney, & 
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Schiavo, 1979; Doherty & Mynatt, 1986), and of the “sufficiency” strategy in the evaluation of 
contingency tables (Mandel & Lehman, 1998). Both those phenomena are denoted by a focus of 
participants on conditional probabilities under a focal hypothesis, unmatched by an adequate 
consideration of conditional probabilities under the alternatives. These behaviors might arguably 
originate from a “matching bias”, defined by Evans (1998) – in the domain of propositional 
reasoning – as a tendency to consider as relevant only the information whose lexical content 
matches that of a propositional rule to be tested. Villejoubert and Mandel (2002) conjectured that a 
similar matching tendency might affect some probabilistic judgments. Positive testing and the 
preference for testing features probable under the focal hypothesis, together, accounted for almost 
60% of the variance of the responses by the participants in Experiment 4. 
9. Conclusions 
In tasks where previous knowledge and motivational factors are unlikely to play an 
important role, people’s hypothesis-testing strategies are far less variegated and sophisticated than 
those observed in more contextualized studies, such as those by Trope and his colleagues (1997; 
2004), Skov, Sherman and their colleagues (1986, 1992), or Poletiek and Berndsen (2000). In the 
present tasks the context – being minimal – possibly gave participants no reason whatsoever for 
preferring to risk false positive errors instead of false negative errors, or vice-versa. As a 
consequence, participants’ individual preferences, in aggregated form, were indifferent to the 
symmetrical or asymmetrical properties of a question (whether or not they actually grasped them). 
Participants anchored their judgments to an easily accessible (Trope & Bassok, 1982) formally 
relevant feature – the diagnosticity of the question, as shown by the correlations in Experiments 1 to 
3 –  and to other easily accessible, but formally irrelevant, superficial features, such as positivity (all 
Experiments) or the probability of a feature under the focal hypothesis (Experiment 4). More 
complex, symmetry related features had little or no effect on responses, suggesting that hypothesis-
testing behaviour in unfamiliar, abstract contexts is driven by simple, intuitive evaluations, more 
than complex,  analytical ones. 
 
QUESTION PREFERENCES IN HYPOTHESIS TESTING     36 
 
In conclusion, in the light of our results, two main factors seem to drive people's testing preferences 
in abstract tasks: diagnosticity, and positivity.  Contrary to some previous claims, extremity – either 
in its proper meaning of a tendency toward asymmetrically disconfirming testing, or  in the more 
general meaning of asymmetric testing of both sorts – does not play a significant role. Asymmetric 
testing, of both types, certainly occurs sometimes; yet, the circumstances that allow to observe and 
replicate it are in need of being  further qualified. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. A sample problem (problem 8, Experiments 1 and 2).  
 
 
In front of you there are two decks of cards, each one composed of 100 cards. Printed on each card there are from zero 
to four geometric figures, chosen from among a triangle, a circle, a square, and a pentagon. The presence or absence of 
each figure on a card is fully independent from the presence or absence of any other figure. The following table shows 
the number of cards that display each figure:  
 
 Triangle Circle Square Pentagon 
A deck 77 80 20 8 
B deck 8 20 80 77 
 
Now imagine that I draw a card at random from one of the two decks, but I don’t tell you from which deck, and I don’t 
show you the content of the card. Below there are four questions that you can ask, concerning the card. Experiment 1 
version: Check the two questions that you deem most useful for determining whether the card was most likely drawn 
from the A deck (B deck, for half participants). Experiment 2 version: Rank in order the questions from most to least 
useful for determining whether the card was most likely drawn from the A deck (B deck, for half participants). Write 
“1” in the box beside the question or the questions that you surmise to be the most useful for determining whether the 
card was most likely drawn from the A deck; write “2” beside the question or the questions that you surmise to be 
second for usefulness, write “3” beside the question or questions third for usefulness, and so on.  Remember to assign 
the same rank to the questions that you judge equally useful.  
 
Is there a triangle on the card? 
Is there a circle on the card? 
Is there a square on the card? 
Is there a pentagon on the card? 
 
How confident are you in the correctness of your answer? 
 
least confident    1        2             3          4          5         6       7    most confident 
 
 2
 
 
Note. In this problem the asymmetric questions are “Is there a triangle?” (LR = 9.63 for “yes”, LR = 0.25 for “no”) and 
“Is there a pentagon?” (LR = 0.10 for “yes”, and LR = 4 for “no”), whereas the other two questions are symmetric. The 
positive questions are “Is there a triangle?” and “Is there a circle?”, where the focal hypothesis is the A deck (otherwise 
the positive questions are the other two questions).  
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Appendix B. The 8 problems in Experiments 1 and 2 
 
Problem Deck p(triangle) p(circle) p(square) p(pentagon) 
1 
A 0.8 0.9 0.08 0.2 
B 0.2 0.08 0.9 0.8 
2 
A 0.8 0.46 0.05 0.2 
B 0.2 0.05 0.46 0.8 
3 
A 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.3 
B 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.8 
4 
A 0.95 0.8 0.2 0.54 
B 0.54 0.2 0.8 0.95 
5 
A 0.8 0.48 0.12 0.2 
B 0.2 0.12 0.48 0.8 
6 
A 0.8 0.88 0.52 0.2 
B 0.2 0.52 0.88 0.8 
7 
A 0.8 0.92 0.23 0.2 
B 0.2 0.23 0.92 0.8 
8 
A 0.77 0.8 0.2 0.08 
B 0.08 0.2 0.8 0.77 
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Appendix C. Some formal properties of the problems used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Problem Question Response p( resp) I.G. W.E. Expected I.G. Mean W.E. Focus on Deck A Focus on Deck B 
1 
Triangle? Yes .5 .28 6.02 .28 6.02 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .28 6.02 
Circle? Yes .49 .6 10.51 .56 10.07 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .51 .53 9.64 
Square? Yes .49 .6 10.51 .56 10.07 Disconfirming, negative Confirming, positive No .51 .53 9.64 
Pentagon? Yes .5 .28 6.02 .28 6.02 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .28 6.02 
2 
Triangle? Yes .5 .28 6.02 .28 6.02 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .28 6.02 
Circle? Yes .26 .53 9.64 .18 4.29 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .75 .06 2.45 
Square? Yes .26 .53 9.64 .18 4.29 Disconfirming,negative Confirming, positive No .75 .06 2.45 
Pentagon? Yes .5 .28 6.02 .28 6.02 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .28 6.02 
3 
Triangle? Yes .55 .15 4.26 .19 4.79 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .45 .24 5.44 
Circle? Yes .5 .53 9.54 .53 9.54 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .53 9.54 
Square? Yes .5 .53 9.54 .53 9.54 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .53 9.54 
Pentagon? Yes .55 .16 4.26 .2 4.79 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .45 .24 5.44 
4 
Triangle? Yes .75 .06 2.45 .18 4.29 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .26 .53 9.64 
Circle? Yes .5 .28 6.02 .28 6.02 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .28 6.02 
Square? Yes .5 .28 6.02 .28 6.02 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .28 6.02 
Pentagon? Yes .75 .06 2.45 .18 4.29 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .26 .53 9.64 
5 
Triangle? Yes .5 .28 6.02 .28 6.02 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .28 6.02 
Circle? Yes .3 .28 6.02 .12 3.41 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .7 .05 2.28 
Square? Yes .3 .28 6.02 .12 3.41 Disconfirming, negative Confirming, positive No .7 .05 2.28 
Pentagon? Yes .5 .28 6.02 .28 6.02 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .28 6.02 
6 
Triangle? Yes .5 .28 6.02 .28 6.02 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .28 6.02 
Circle? Yes .7 .05 2.28 .12 3.41 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .3 .28 6.02 
Square? Yes .7 .05 2.28 .12 3.41 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .3 .28 6.02 
Pentagon? Yes .5 .28 6.02 .28 6.02 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .28 6.02 
7 
Triangle? Yes .5 .28 6.02 .28 6.02 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .28 6.02 
Circle? Yes .58 .28 6.02 .4 7.64 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .43 .56 9.83 
Square? Yes .58 .28 6.02 .4 7.64 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .43 .56 9.83 
Pentagon? Yes .5 .28 6.02 .28 6.02 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .28 6.02 
8 
Triangle? Yes .43 .55 9.83 .39 7.64 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .58 .28 6.02 
Circle? Yes .5 .28 6.02 .28 6.02 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .28 6.02 
Square? Yes .5 .28 6.02 .28 6.02 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .28 6.02 
Pentagon? Yes .43 .56 9.83 .4 7.64 Disconfirming, negative Confirming, positive No .58 .28 6.02 
p(resp) = probability of receiving that response 
I.G.(information gain)  = p(H)log2[1/p(H)]+p(¬H)log2[1/ p(¬H)]- p(H|E)log2[1/p(H|E)]+p(¬H|E)log2[1/ p(¬H|E)]; this 
is the difference in Shannon’s entropy after a response (E) is received, in bits.  
W.E. (weight of evidence) = 10*log10 LR, in decibans (Good, 1983). This is often used instead of the raw LR.  
Expected I.G.= p(yes)*I.G.(yes)+p(no)*I.G.(no). A measure of the diagnosticity of a question 
Mean W.E. = p(yes)*W.E.(yes)+p(no)*W.E.(no). Another measure of the diagnosticity of a question.  
The last two columns report the classification of each question, depending on the focal hypothesis (either Deck A or B)  
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Appendix D. The 8 problems used in Experiment 3. 
 
Problem Deck p(triangle) p(circle) p(square) p(pentagon) 
1 
A 0.82 0.92 0.06 0.18 
B 0.18 0.06 0.92 0.82 
2 
A 0.81 0.47 0.04 0.19 
B 0.19 0.04 0.47 0.81 
3 
A 0.81 0.88 0.12 0.39 
B 0.39 0.12 0.88 0.81 
4 
A 0.96 0.86 0.14 0.37 
B 0.37 0.14 0.86 0.96 
5 
A 0.82 0.41 0.09 0.18 
B 0.18 0.09 0.41 0.82 
6 
A 0.84 0.92 0.58 0.16 
B 0.16 0.58 0.92 0.84 
7 
A 0.79 0.94 0.25 0.21 
B 0.21 0.25 0.94 0.79 
8 
A 0.75 0.79 0.21 0.06 
B 0.06 0.21 0.79 0.75 
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Appendix E. Some formal properties of the 8 problems in Experiment 3 (legend in appendix C).  
 
Problem Question Response p(resp) I.G. W.E. Expected I.G. Mean W.E. Focus on Deck A Focus on Deck B 
1 
Triangle? Yes .5 .32 6.59 .32 6.59 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .32 6.59 
Circle? Yes .49 .67 11.86 .63 11.27 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .51 .6 10.7 
Square? Yes .49 .67 11.86 .63 11.27 Disconfirming, negative Confirming, positive No .51 .6 10.7 
Pentagon? Yes .5 .32 6.59 .32 6.59 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .32 6.59 
2 
Triangle? Yes .5 .3 6.3 .3 6.3 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .3 6.3 
Circle? Yes .255 .6 10.7 .2 4.65 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .745 .06 2.58 
Square? Yes .255 .6 10.7 .2 4.65 Disconfirming, negative Confirming, positive No .745 .06 2.58 
Pentagon? Yes .5 .3 6.3 .3 6.3 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .3 6.3 
3 
Triangle? Yes .6 .09 3.17 .14 3.93 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .4 .20 5.07 
Circle? Yes .5 .47 8.65 .47 8.65 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .47 8.65 
Square? Yes .5 .47 8.65 .47 8.65 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .47 8.65 
Pentagon? Yes .6 .09 3.17 .14 3.93 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .4 .20 5.07 
4 
Triangle? Yes .665 .15 4.14 .32 6.76 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .335 .67 11.97 
Circle? Yes .5 .42 7.88 .42 7.88 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .42 7.88 
Square? Yes .5 .42 7.88 .42 7.88 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .42 7.88 
Pentagon? Yes .665 .14 4.14 .32 6.76 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .335 .67 11.97 
5 
Triangle? Yes .5 .32 6.59 .32 6.59 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .32 6.59 
Circle? Yes .25 .32 6.59 .11 3.06 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .75 .04 1.88 
Square? Yes .25 .32 6.59 .11 3.06 Disconfirming, negative Confirming, positive No .75 .04 1.88 
Pentagon? Yes .5 .32 6.59 .32 6.59 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .32 6.59 
6 
Triangle? Yes .5 .37 7.2 .37 7.2 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .37 7.2 
Circle? Yes .75 .04 2 .12 3.3 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .25 .37 7.2 
Square? Yes .75 .04 2 .12 3.3 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .25 .37 7.2 
Pentagon? Yes .5 .37 7.2 .37 7.2 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .37 7.2 
7 
Triangle? Yes .5 .26 5.75 .26 5.75 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .26 5.75 
Circle? Yes .595 .26 5.75 .41 7.86 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .405 .63 10.97 
Square? Yes .595 .26 5.75 .41 7.86 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .405 .63 10.97 
Pentagon? Yes .5 .26 5.75 .26 5.75 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .26 5.75 
8 
Triangle? Yes .405 .62 10.97 .40 7.86 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .595 .26 5.75 
Circle? Yes .5 .26 5.75 .26 5.75 Symmetric, positive Symmetric, negative No .5 .26 5.75 
Square? Yes .5 .26 5.75 .26 5.75 Symmetric, negative Symmetric, positive No .5 .26 5.75 
Pentagon? Yes .405 .63 10.97 .41 7.86 Disconfirming, negative Confirming, positive No .595 .26 5.75 
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Appendix F. The 8 problems used in Experiment 4.  
 
 
Problem Deck P(triangle) P(circle) P(square) P(pentagon) Diagnosticity  
of questions 
1 
A 0.11 0.98 0.89 0.02 
Low 
 
(mean WE = .87, 
 I.G. between .026 and .008) 
B 0.02 0.89 0.98 0.11 
2 
A 0.68 0.11 0.58 0.02 
B 0.58 0.02 0.68 0.11 
3 
A 0.98 0.68 0.89 0.58 
B 0.89 0.58 0.98 0.68 
4 
A 0.68 0.49 0.58 0.39 
B 0.58 0.39 0.68 0.49  
5 
A 0.98 0.38 0.02 0.62 
High 
 
(mean W.E. = 4.15, 
I.G. between .15 and .17) 
B 0.62 0.02 0.38 0.98 
6 
A 0.38 0.62 0.02 0.18 
B 0.02 0.18 0.38 0.62 
7 
A 0.62 0.98 0.18 0.62 
B 0.18 0.62 0.62 0.98 
8 
A 0.62 0.88 0.45 0.18 
B 0.18 0.45 0.88 0.62  
Notes: Bold numerals identify which probability is extreme in each question (i.e., further removed from .5 with respect 
to the other  hypothesis). In the design, extreme probabilities were classified into: 
Very high: p > 0.9 
High: .5 < p < 0.9 
Low: .5 > p > 0.1 
Very low: p < 0.1 
Their association either to the focal or non focal hypothesis generated negative disconfirming, negative confirming, 
positive disconfirming, or positive confirming questions (see Appendix G). 
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Appendix G. Some formal properties of the problems in Experiment 4.  
Problem Question Response p(resp) I.G. W.E. Focus on Deck A Focus on Deck B 
1 
Triangle? Yes .065 .39 7.40 Confirming, positive  Disconfirming, negative No .935 .001 .42 
Circle? Yes .935 .001 .42 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .065 .39 7.40 
Square? Yes .935 .001 .42 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .065 .39 7.40 
Pentagon? Yes .065 .39 7.40 Disconfirming, negative Confirming, positive No .935 .001 .42 
2 
Triangle? Yes .63 .005 .69 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .37 .015 1.18 
Circle? Yes .065 .39 7.40 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .935 .001 .42 
Square? Yes .63 .005 .69 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .37 .015 1.18 
Pentagon? Yes .065 .39 7.40 Disconfirming, negative Confirming, positive No .935 .001 .42 
3 
Triangle? Yes .935 .001 .42 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .065 .39 7.4 
Circle? Yes .63 .005 .69 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .37 .014 1.18 
Square? Yes .935 .001 .42 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .065 .39 7.4 
Pentagon? Yes .63 .005 .69 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .37 .014 1.18 
4 
Triangle? Yes .63 .005 .69 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .37 .014 1.18 
Circle? Yes .44 .01 .99 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .56 .005 .78 
Square? Yes .63 .005 .69 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .37 .014 1.18 
Pentagon? Yes .44 .01 .99 Disconfirming, negative Confirming, positive No .56 .005 .78 
5 
Triangle? Yes .8 .035 1.99 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .2 .714 12.79 
Circle? Yes .2 715 12.79 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .8 .035 1.99 
Square? Yes .2 .714 12.79 Disconfirming, negative Confirming, positive No .8 .035 1.99 
Pentagon? Yes .8 .035 1.99 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, Positive No .2 .714 12.79 
6 
Triangle? Yes .2 .714 12.79 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .8 .035 1.99 
Circle? Yes .4 .233 5.37 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .6 .096 3.34 
Square? Yes .2 .714 12.79 Disconfirming, negative Confirming, positive No .8 .035 1.99 
Pentagon? Yes .4 .233 5.37 Disconfirming,negative Confirming,positive No .6 .096 3.34 
7 
Triangle? Yes .4 .233 5.37 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .6 .096 3.34 
Circle? Yes .8 .035 1.99 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .2 .714 12.79 
Square? Yes .4 .233 5.37 Disconfirming, negative Confirming, positive No .6 .096 3.34 
Pentagon? Yes .8 .035 1.99 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .2 .714 12.79 
8 
Triangle? Yes .4 .233 5.37 Confirming, positive Disconfirming, negative No .6 .096 3.34 
Circle? Yes .665 .075 2.91 Disconfirming, positive Confirming, negative No .335 .32 6.61 
Square? Yes .665 .075 2.91 Confirming, negative Disconfirming, positive No .335 .32 6.61 
Pentagon? Yes .4 .233 5.37 Disconfirming, negative Confirming,  positive No .6 .096 3.34 
For the expected I.G. and mean W.E. of questions, see appendix F.  
Negative disconfirming questions: extreme in the “low” or “very low” ranges associated to the focal hypothesis.  
Positive confirming questions: extreme in the “low” or “very low” ranges associated to the non-focal hypothesis. 
Negative confirming questions: extreme in the “high” or “very high” ranges associated to the non-focal hypothesis. 
Positive disconfirming questions: extreme in the “high” or “very high” ranges associated to the focal hypothesis. 
 
